Critic speak is tough, but we've got you covered.
Quote :“On the Algebra of Logic,” in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce vols. 3 and 4: “Exact Logic” and “The Simplest Mathematics”
A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. If this triple relation is not of a degenerate species, the sign is related to its object only in consequence of a mental association, and depends upon a habit. Such signs are always abstract and general, because habits are general rules to which the organism has become subjected. They are, for the most part, conventional or arbitrary. They include all general words, the main body of speech, and any mode of conveying a judgment.
Peirce is the guy who revamped the Saussurian model of signifier/signified, coming up with a three-part model of signification instead featuring the icon, the index, and the symbol. The quote above gives us the gist of Peirce’s thinking, including the three elements that he sees as making up the signifying process: the sign, the thing denoted, and the mind.
As with semiotics in general, Peirce emphasizes that the relationship between the sign and its object is a matter of habit rather than something ready-made (sound familiar?). Like Saussure, Peirce refers to the connections established through signification as being based on convention and repetition (though these connections can, of course, become cultural norms). As Peirce also observes, signification operates on both a macro and a micro level, taking in of every part of communication.
We all know that theoretical works can be difficult to get a handle on, but the above quote gives us a nifty summary of both Peirce’s triangular model and the “arbitrariness” that gets mentioned in pretty much any discussion of semiotics. It also brings us back to the fact that the term “sign” doesn’t just relate to a particular kind of text or image, but applies to all kinds of stuff.