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Quote :Theory of Semiotics
Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. Thus semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used “to tell” at all. I think that the definition of a “theory of the lie” should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics.
Here, Eco gives us an idea (or at least an echo) of the wide scope of semiotics. As we mentioned earlier, semiotics doesn’t have a strict method or set of core texts. What we can say, however, is that semiotics involves the study of signs, and that a sign is something that stands in for something else. Some scholars may zone in on linguistics while others (such as Roland Barthes) have a broader outlook. Despite the hundreds of rides in this wide-ranging theme park, Eco does a good job of defining semiotics.
Next, Eco goes on to argue that semiotics studies “everything which can be used in order to lie.” So it’s like the Pinocchio of theories? Well, it’s not so much that people always use signs in order to tell fibs; it’s more that the very act of standing in for something else opens a sign up to having all sorts of motives and meanings, depending on how and when it’s used. Remember that there’s no actual cord binding the signifier and signified. Instead, there’s a space in which an imaginary connection is created.
Another thing that Eco discusses here is the sign’s role as a substitute, meaning that a sign can stand in for something else, whether or not that something is actually present when the sign stands in for it, or even exists at all (i.e. as an object in the here and now).
Sure, a sign like “tree” can refer to a leafy thing planted outside your house, but a sign like “Mars” can stand for a thing that’s zillions of light years away (or for a Roman God, or a chocolate bar), and a sign like “apathy” can stand for a thing that’s not even a thing.
If we recognize this, then this helps emphasize that there’s no real connection between signifier and signified: what we’re talking about is a conceptual space in which a connection can be set up and, over time, come to seem run-of-the-mill.
When Eco suggests that a “theory of the lie” should be taken as a program for semiotics, it might seem like he’s just being controversial by calling his academic colleagues a bunch of two-faced liars. If you think about Eco’s reasoning, however, you get a better idea of the logic behind his statement. After all, if the connection between signifier and signified is arbitrary, then the signifier can hardly be seen as a beacon of authenticity, can it?