How we cite our quotes: (Book.Chapter.Bekker #s); all Bekker line numbers are approximate, since they are keyed to the original Greek.
Quote #7
What, then, prevents one from calling happy someone who is active in accord with complete virtue and who is adequately equipped with external goods, not for any chance time but in a complete life? Or must one posit in addition that he will both live in this way and meet his end accordingly—since the future is immanifest to us, and we posit happiness, wholly and in every way, as an end and as complete? (1.10.1101a15-19)
Aristotle's been wrestling with the idea of calling a man happy before he is dead. Why is this even an issue? Because what happens if a person lives a happy life all the way till the end, and something catastrophic happens to him? Should happiness be judged only when the whole of it can be assessed? Aristotle thinks that it is perfectly possible to assess a life in progress, especially if a person is living a life of virtue and is well equipped to deal with adversity…if it should come along.
Quote #8
...let us say that wisdom and prudence are necessarily choiceworthy in themselves, since each of them is a virtue of each part [of the soul], even if neither one of them makes or produces anything. Second, they do in fact make or produce something, not as the art of medicine produces health, but, rather, just as health produces health, so wisdom produces happiness. For wisdom, being part of the whole of virtue, makes one happy by being possessed and by being active. (6.12.1144a1-6)
This argument resembles a dog chasing its tail: wisdom makes us happy because we are happy being wise. But Aristotle sees more subtlety to this argument. By choosing a life conducive to wisdom, we're making a good choice—a choice that accords with an intellectual virtue. And people who make good choices tend to be happy people. It seems so simple, but of course, the acquisition of knowledge is a serious undertaking.
Quote #9
For this reason, all people suppose the happy life to be pleasant, and they weave pleasure into happiness—reasonably so. For no activity is complete when it is impeded, but happiness is among the things that are complete. Hence the happy person needs in addition the goods residing in the body as well as external goods and chance, so that he not be impeded in these respects. (7.13.1153b14-19)
Aristotle's responding here to allegations that pleasures are naughty and should be avoided. Okay, that's an oversimplification of the discussion, but that is the essential point. We must be realistic enough to understand that no person can be happy without pleasure—since the opposite of pleasure is pain.
Since happiness is the most complete of all goods (needing nothing further to be most excellent) and since humans live inside of a body, pleasure is clearly part of those goods possessed by the happy person. Of course, there are ways that we can go overboard with pleasure—but that's another discussion.